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Medicine Infected by Politics:  




“I will keep them from harm and injustice… whatever houses I 
may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of 
all intentional injustice.” — Oath of Hippocrates 
 
During a 1927 speech at the annual meeting of the 
Association of American Medical Colleges, C.S. Butler, having 
recently finished his tenure as the Sanitary Engineer of Haiti, 
commented on the role of physicians in the American occupation 
of Haiti:  
 
We physicians have failed to appreciate the enormous 
importance of our calling in helping governments to confer 
the benefits of civilization upon backward races… When a 
physician cures the complaints of an individual, he nearly 
always captures the friendship of that individual at the same 
time. So it is with governments in relation to the masses.1 
 
The overarching tenet of medicine and the sworn mission of 
all physicians is to do no harm to the patient. Yet, such as all goals, 
the goal of medicine can sometimes become perverted. Doctors 
and patients do not exist in a vacuum, and thus all sickness and 
healing occurs within certain social, personal, and even political 
contexts. Yes, political. Desirable though it may be to separate 
health from politics, illness and death are ubiquitous to the human 
experience, and thus, treatment of the sick lies within the realm of 
social and political influence. Therefore, medicine is a tool that can 
                                                          
1 C. S. Butler, “Coordination of Medical Problems; Medical Education; Public Health and 
Hospitals in the Republic of Haiti,” Academic Medicine 3, no. 1 (1928): 48. 
1
Scherr: Medicine Infected by Politics
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
 89 
be both wielded and shaped by politics. Various social and 
political factors can affect how, when, and for whose benefit 
medicine is practiced, and thus distort the humanitarian purpose of 
medicine itself. Such was the case during the American occupation 
of Haiti from 1915-1934. 
America opened the 20th century intent on controlling the 
Western hemisphere and assuming a role as a global economic 
power. This surge of American imperialism fed into the Spanish-
American War at the turn of the century and subsequent U.S. 
efforts to maintain control of its territorial acquisitions in the 
Pacific and Caribbean. Throughout this period, the United States 
carefully sought to portray its expansionist aims as beneficent 
rather than imperial. After all, the nation’s ethos was one of liberty 
and democracy, and the advent of America itself was characterized 
by the overthrow of foreign colonial rule. Therefore, the United 
States attempted to convince the world—and itself—that American 
imperialism differed from the colonial endeavors of Old World 
powers. Economic expansion? No, this was democratic pioneering. 
Imperial conquest? Try humanitarian uplift. Thus, the United 
States painted itself as a physician come to cure a patient plagued 
by illness; by administering the medicines of democracy and 
capitalism, the backwards colonies could be saved from their literal 
and metaphorical diseases. 
Haiti was one such patient that fell under the “care” of the 
United States. Rife with political turmoil and saddled with debt to 
American investors, Haiti posed an opportunity for the U.S. to cure 
yet another blight in the Western hemisphere. Following the 
assassination of President Vilbrun Guillame Sam in 1915, the U.S. 
jumped at the chance to “save” Haiti. American troops—stationed 
just off the coast—immediately landed in Port-au-Prince and set 
about implementing the U.S. intervention in Haiti. For the next two 
decades, the Americans would prescribe whatever remedy they 
deemed necessary for Haiti. However, treatment of Haitian ills was 
compromised by the ulterior motives of the United States, and 
what was best for American interests was misconstrued as being 
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best for Haiti. By 1934, upon U.S. withdrawal from Haiti, the 
American intervention had left a complicated legacy of both harm 
and good. 
In analyzing the American occupation of Haiti, it is crucial to 
distinguish how the faux humanitarianism of the U.S. government 
impacted the genuine humanitarian goals of medicine. America 
was primarily interested in Haiti because it wished to preserve its 
political influence in the Western hemisphere and acquire Haiti as 
a new market for U.S. investors. However, the multitude of 
problems plaguing Haiti—including political instability, 
widespread poverty, and poor public health—allowed the U.S. to 
disguise its invasion as a humanitarian intervention. In reality, 
Haitian benefit was always of secondary concern to the U.S. 
government. While American politicians employed 
humanitarianism as a front for the occupation, American 
physicians genuinely sought to improve the well-being of the 
Haitian populace. Recognizing the positive impact that medicine 
could have on Haitian health, the American doctors set about 
treating disease—both physiological and cultural—as they saw fit. 
However, the imperialism of the occupation distorted the 
humanitarian goals of medicine in Haiti.  
The political objectives of the occupation meant that 
medicine was employed for a variety of purposes. First, medicine 
served as a means of protecting the American occupation force 
from disease and death in the tropics. Following the establishment 
of American control in Haiti, the function of medicine changed 
from a tool of pacification to a tool of propaganda. As the U.S. 
looked to justify its presence in Haiti, the American treatment of 
diseases such as malaria, yaws, and syphilis was held up as a bright 
spot of the occupation. U.S. doctors were not only improving the 
health of Haitian citizens, America argued, but also restoring the 
vitality of the country as a whole. However, the failure of 
occupation medicine to dramatically improve overall Haitian 
health subsequently cast doubt on the motives behind U.S. medical 
relief. Had the Americans sincerely sought to improve the lives of 
3
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Haitians, or had they simply wielded medicine as a political tool 
for their own benefit? The American occupation of Haiti 
highlighted the susceptibility of medicine to political aims and left 
a blemish on the record of medical humanitarianism. The U.S. had 
entered Haiti preaching of a miracle cure but left its “patient” 
perhaps worse off than before. 
 
Historiography 
Historians have been quick to decry the Americans’ stated 
humanitarian aims when invading Haiti. According to Hans 
Schmidt, “the immediate objectives of American expansion were 
to achieve hegemony in the Caribbean and the Pacific”—Haiti was 
no exception.2 Throughout the late 1800s, the United States had 
been in competition with European powers for lucrative overseas 
trade routes and strategic military objectives, and the 19th century 
culminated with U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War. The 
resulting Treaty of Paris in 1898 brought the U.S. new territories in 
both the Pacific and the Caribbean, and the construction of the 
Panama Canal in 1914 officially linked the two regions of 
America’s imperial interests.3 Having established control over the 
Americas, the U.S. was keen on keeping Europe out of its 
transoceanic empire. The primary threat to U.S. influence in the 
Caribbean, according to Schmidt, was Germany. 4 With its 
powerful navy and an economic foothold in Haiti, Germany stood 
poised to capitalize on the instability of the Haitian state in 1915. 
Therefore, following President Sam’s assassination, the United 
States acted to preserve its Caribbean dominance by landing troops 
in Haiti. Contrary to characterizations of an American Open Door 
policy in the early 20th century, Schmidt claims that the occupation 
                                                          
2 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1995), 4. 
3 Ibid., 3-5. 
4 Ibid., 4. 
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of Haiti demonstrated the Americans’ “closed-door, sphere of 
influence diplomacy.”5 
In addition to U.S. political interests, American economic 
involvement in Haiti also played a significant role in the decision 
to intervene. Jeffrey Sommers notes that “as early as 1910, five 
years before the U.S. occupation of Haiti, United States banking 
interests obtained partial ownership of the National Bank of 
Haiti.”6 With American capital tied up in the Haitian bank, the 
U.S. was willing to forcefully intervene in order to protect 
American investments from the growing unrest in Haiti. According 
to Patricia J. Lopez, the Americans’ “big stick diplomacy” in Haiti 
built off the precedent set by Haitian-American relations of the 19th 
century. From 1849-1913, the U.S. had made a habit of sending 
troops into Haiti, intervening on over two dozen occasions.7 
Leading up to the invasion of 1915, American involvement in Haiti 
had increased even further, with ten landings of U.S. troops in 
Haiti during 1914 alone.8 Lopez states that prior to the occupation, 
the U.S. was also interested in obtaining Haiti as a potential market 
for American land ownership and railroad development.9 Thus, in 
the eyes of the U.S., Haiti was a fruit waiting to be plucked, and 
the instability of the Haitian state in 1915 provided the perfect 
excuse to expand into a new economic market. 
Most historians argue that racial paternalism also played a 
part in the United States’ blatant disregard for Haitian autonomy. 
Schmidt states that, in dealing with the Haitians, the Americans 
believed them to be “inherently inferior,” and “approached [them] 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 6. 
6 Jeffrey W. Sommers, “The U.S. Power Elite and the Political Economy of Haiti’s 
Occupation: Investment, Race, and World Order,” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 2 
(2015): 57. 
7 Patricia J. Lopez, “Clumsy Beginnings: From ‘Modernizing Mission’ to 
Humanitarianism in the U.S. Occupation of Haiti (1915-1934),” Environment and 
Planning A, 47 (2015): 2243. 
8 Ibid., 2243. 
9 Ibid., 2243-2244 
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with ethnic and racial contempt.”10 In Taking Haiti, Mary Renda 
expands upon this idea, stating that paternalism was in fact the 
driving force of the occupation as a whole.11 U.S. Marines, Renda 
states, considered themselves father figures to the Haitians, and 
were convinced that the occupation was of great service to Haiti.12 
In the words of Marine General Smedley Butler: “We were all 
[imbued] with the fact that we were the trustees of a huge estate 
that belonged to minors.”13 This characterization of the Haitians as 
incompetent minors stemmed from racist preconceptions in the 
United States. For example, the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus 
Daniels, compared the Haitians to the American “negroes in the 
South,” while Rear Admiral William Caperton, seeking to justify 
U.S. presence in Haiti, portrayed the people as dark cannibals in 
need of firm guidance.14,15 In this way, America established a clear 
power dynamic with Haiti. As a father figure to the “orphaned 
nation,” the U.S. espoused concern for Haiti’s well-being, yet was 
justified in exercising authority over—and even disciplining—the 
smaller nation.16 Thus, when faced with the stark contradiction 
between the occupation of Haiti and the national values of freedom 
and democracy, paternalism—a veneer for racism—offered 
Americans a convenient explanation for the discrepancy. 
This discrepancy was on full display in the U.S. takeover of 
the Haitian government. Believing the Haitians to be incapable of 
self-government, the U.S. imposed the Haitian-American Treaty of 
1915, which outlined a “partnership” between the two nations that 
condoned an American presence in Haiti until 1936. According to 
Schmidt, the treaty was morally and legally binding only at U.S. 
                                                          
10 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 10,15. 
11 Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 
1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 15. 
12 Ibid., 13. 
13 Ibid., 13. 
14 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 69. 
15 Sommers, “The U.S. Power Elite and the Political Economy of Haiti’s Occupation,” 
56. 
16 Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism,15. 
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convenience; the Americans “frequently cited [the treaty] as 
justification for continuing the occupation,” that is until uprisings 
in Haiti prompted an early U.S. withdrawal in 1934.17 In the 
meantime, America operated without any regard for the Haitian 
democratic system, ramrodding the Haitian Constitution of 1918 
into effect. The new constitution suspended the Haitian legislature, 
legalized American martial law, and—most symbolically—
removed the ban on white, alien land ownership in Haiti (this law 
was a testament to the slave history of Haiti, and had been intended 
to preclude any future of white dominion over Haiti).18 When the 
Haitian government refused to ratify the constitution, the U.S. 
disbanded the legislature and appointed its own Council of State. 
The puppet government obediently installed the American-
sponsored constitution and was not assembled again until the 
occurrence of anti-American riots in 1929.19 
The paternalistic aims of the U.S. also meant that medicine, 
with its positive impact on individual health, proved to be a key 
symbolic component of the occupation. According to Antony 
Stewart in “An Imperial Laboratory,” Haiti had a reputation as a 
den of sickness and filth, contributing to the perception of its being 
a backwards nation. Thus, as the Americans entered Haiti, 
medicine offered an obvious means of uplifting the Haitians from 
their apparently substandard existence. 20 In addition to Stewart, 
many other historians have commented on the various functions of 
medicine during the occupation. Beyond basic improvements in 
health, historians have noted the Americans’ use of medicine to 
exert control over Haiti, pacify Haitian citizens, and justify the 
U.S. presence to the outside world.21 However, although the effect 
of medicine on the occupation has been acknowledged, the 
                                                          
17 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 11. 
18 Ibid., 11. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Antony Dalziel McNeil Stewart, “An Imperial Laboratory: The Investigation and 
Treatment of Treponematoses in Occupied Haiti, 1915-1934,” História, Ciências, 
Saúde—Manguinhos 24, no. 4 (2017): 1091-1092. 
21 Ibid., 1091-1093. 
7
Scherr: Medicine Infected by Politics
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
 95 
historiography fails to recognize the reciprocal effect that the 
occupation had on medicine. Indeed, U.S. motives in Haiti shaped 
the goals of medicine and how it was employed during the 
occupation. 
 
Medicine in the Hands of the Military 
In the beginning years of the occupation, medicine became a 
tool for conquest that was selectively practiced in accordance with 
U.S. objectives. In the hands of the military, medicine’s primary 
goals were: 1) to keep U.S. troops healthy; 2) to control and pacify 
the populace. Historically, the tropics had been considered the 
“white man’s graveyard”; in Haiti for example, yellow fever had 
ravaged both the French and British ranks during the Haitian 
Revolution. The U.S. was well aware of this history, and anxious 
not to repeat it.22 However, due to its forays into Panama, Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, the U.S. had plenty of experience 
with tropical medicine prior to 1915. Having “[tamed] the tropics” 
previously, the Americans knew how to employ medicine 
strategically in Haiti.23 Thus, before the Marines even set foot on 
Haitian soil, medicine played a role in opening up Haiti for U.S. 
intervention. 
Once in Haiti, the occupation quickly became militarized. 
Despite easily establishing military control in Port-au-Prince and 
other coastal cities in 1915, U.S. forces were not received warmly 
by the Haitians. In urban areas, people would glare at the Marines 
and pour household refuse onto American patrols that walked 
under their windows.24 Meanwhile, in the countryside, U.S. troops 
were opposed by Haitian guerilla forces, or cacos. Faced with 
hostility from the populace, Admiral Caperton admitted that the 
occupation began to be defined by military objectives, and “the 
                                                          
22 Butler, “Coordination of Medical Problems,” 48. 
23 Stewart, “An Imperial Laboratory: The Investigation and Treatment of Treponematoses 
in Occupied Haiti, 1915-1934,” 1092. 
24 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 68. 
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‘human’ in humanitarian was reduced to ‘combatant.’”25 Thus, 
from 1915-1922, U.S. Marines set about eliminating rural pockets 
of resistance in a series of campaigns termed the First and Second 
Caco Wars. These “wars” proved extremely one-sided, as Haitian 
casualties totaled more than 2,000 dead by 1922, compared to only 
a couple dozen American dead.26 In addition to decimating the 
cacos, the American occupying force treated the Haitian citizenry 
with a marked degree of brutality. In 1919, Brigadier General 
George Barnett wrote to Colonel John H. Russell to complain 
about the “practically indiscriminate killing of natives” occurring 
in Haiti, eliciting an investigation into abuses by the Americans 
and Haitian gendarmes—Haitians conscripted into service with the 
U.S. military.27 Out of 52 cases later brought before a court of 
inquiry, only 18 were found to contain punishable offenses—the 
rest were dismissed as the “casualties of ‘savage warfare.’”28 
The Americans’ heavy-handed approach towards the Haitians 
also negatively impacted medical efforts in Haiti. First, medicine 
was rationed in favor of the American occupation force, and only 
practiced for the benefit of the Haitian populace when conducive to 
American military aims. This prioritization of American health 
over Haitian health was evident in an anti-malaria campaign 
conducted by naval medical officers in late 1922. Since arriving in 
Haiti, U.S. troops had been hampered by a high frequency of 
malaria in their camps, despite the best efforts of the medical 
officers to sanitize the U.S. posts. For a seven-month period 
spanning from 1921-1922, 687 cases of malaria were reported 
among the Americans—indicating a rate of nearly one case per 
soldier.29 The poor health of the Marines equated to exceedingly 
large treatment costs and decreased military efficiency, and thus 
                                                          
25 Lopez, “Clumsy Beginnings,” 2247. 
26 John J. Tierney Jr., “America’s ‘Black Vietnam’: Haiti’s Cacos vs. The Marine Corps, 
1915-22,” Lincoln Review 2, no. 3 (1981)) 
27 Lopez, “Clumsy Beginnings,” 2246. 
28 Ibid, 2247. 
29 “Antimalaria Campaign Conducted in Haiti by Naval Medical Officers,” Public Health 
Reports (1896-1970) 38, no. 46 (1923): 2721. 
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prompted preventative efforts to treat malaria among the locals.30 
Medical officers proceeded to treat Haitians living within a one 
mile radius of Marine posts with quinine; during the quininization 
campaign, the Marines reported only 237 cases of malaria over a 
seven-month period.31 Thus, the Americans treated the Haitians for 
disease, but “solely as a prophylactic measure for the [M]arines.”32 
In addition to preserving the health of the Americans, 
medicine also offered a means of stabilization and pacification. 
When the Americans seized Port-au-Prince in late July 1915, they 
discovered “a large population of sick and practically starving 
people” suffering amidst the chaos of the Haitian state.33 To 
compound the problem, the cacos cut off food supplies to urban 
areas in the hopes that the resulting food shortage would hinder the 
U.S. forces. Faced with a destitute population in need of food and 
medical care, the naval medical staff distributed food supplies and 
cared for the medical needs of transient individuals in Port-au-
Prince.34 At face value, this was a humanitarian gesture to the 
conquered populace. However, had the Americans let the Haitians 
die of starvation and disease in the streets, they risked fuelling 
further Haitian hatred and resistance towards the occupation, 
making the island nearly ungovernable. The U.S. would also have 
been compromising its identity as white savior to the poor, 
backwards nation.  
Although medicine proved to be a key tool for the military, 
lack of funding for widespread medical services demonstrated the 
ways in which the politics of the occupation interfered with 
medical work. Under the control of the military, healthcare in Haiti 
was clearly not a priority, as the Americans did not establish a 
Haitian public health service (Service d’Hygiène Publique) until 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 2721-2723. 
31 Ibid., 2722. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 69. 
34 Ibid. 
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1917—two years after invading.35 In the meantime, Admiral 
Caperton had attempted to establish a sanitation program with a 
budget of $76,000;36 in contrast, the Americans set aside 
$3,000,000 of Haiti’s $8,000,000 yearly income to pay off Haitian 
debt to the U.S.37 Evidently, at the outset of the occupation, there 
was little impetus “to build up sanitation and public health beyond 
what would benefit U.S. troops.”38 Therefore, the medical budget 
from 1915-1917 merely provided for a street-sweeping service, 
minimal medicines and vaccines, medical treatment primarily for 
U.S. forces and the gendarmes, and the remodeling of some 
Haitian clinics and hospitals.39 Conditions improved in 1917 with 
the creation of the Public Health Service and the appointment of 
Norman McLean as Sanitary Engineer in Haiti. McLean set about 
organizing a public health system for Haiti and bolstered the 
medical budget to nearly $180,000, yet these improvements still 
proved inadequate considering the needs of the Haitian populace. 
With only five U.S. physicians and a handful of medically-trained 
corpsmen and gendarmes, McLean could only provide medical 
relief in urban districts—this only accounted for an estimated 5-
10% of the Haitian population.40 Thus, not only did medicine 
function as a tool in the hands of the U.S. military, but its goals 
morphed from patient health and well-being to order and control 
via health. Under the supervision of the military, medicine was 
practiced selectively, normally in line with U.S. strategic 
objectives. 
 
Reorganization of the Occupation 
Though successful in establishing order in Haiti, martial law 
did little to advance the condition of the populace, contrary to U.S. 
                                                          
35 Lopez, “Clumsy Beginnings,” 2245. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Butler, “Coordination of Medical Problems,” 53. 
38 Lopez, “Clumsy Beginnings,” 2245. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Lopez, “Clumsy Beginnings,” 2245-2246. 
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portrayals of the occupation. With World War I dominating news 
headlines from 1914-1918, the beginning years of the occupation 
passed largely unnoticed by the American people. In fact, from 
1917-1918, the New York Times did not have a single entry 
regarding Haiti.41 Therefore, as the Wilson administration focused 
its attention on Europe, American policy in Haiti was left up to the 
discretion of U.S. personnel on the ground. Lacking clear policy 
directives from Washington, American civilian and military 
officials clashed over how to best govern Haiti.42 While the 
civilian advisors worked to restructure the Haitian government and 
operate according to the Haitian-American treaty, the Marines set 
about eliminating local resistance and establishing martial law. The 
resulting conflict among the occupation’s leaders rendered the 
American administration in Haiti ineffective and directionless, to 
the point where Wilson considered an American withdrawal in the 
aftermath of the Great War.43 In contrast with actual conditions on 
the ground, the news that reached the American public continued 
to paint a rosy image of the progress being made in Haiti. Thus, 
prior to 1920, Americans largely supported the intervention, with 
vehement objections from only a few journals and publications.44 
However, following the outbreak of the Second Caco War in 
1918, more journalists began to uncover the harsh U.S. treatment 
of the Haitians, prompting protests of the occupation back home. 
One of the most prominent accounts regarding the true nature of 
the occupation came from James W. Johnson of the NAACP, who 
visited Haiti in 1920. During his trip, Johnson met with Haitian 
elites and political activists, noting, “All the Haitians I talked to 
complained bitterly of conditions.”45 Meanwhile, Johnson found 
the Marines to be shockingly dismissive of the Haitians, with one 
                                                          
41 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 109. 
42 Ibid., 116. 
43 Ibid, 118. 
44 Ibid, 120. 
45 James W. Johnson as quoted in McBride, David, Missions for Science: U.S. 
Technology and Medicine in America’s African World (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2002), 85. 
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saying, “The trouble with Haiti is that these n*****s down here 
with a little money and education think they are as good as we 
are.”46 When Johnson returned to the U.S., he proclaimed the 
oppression of the Haitians, sparking fierce public criticism of the 
newly-exposed American imperialism in Haiti. However, 
Woodrow Wilson’s bid for reelection in 1920 forced the president 
to double-down on the Americans’ commitment to the occupation. 
As U.S. atrocities in Haiti came into the public consciousness, the 
Republicans quickly acted to turn favor against Wilson during the 
election campaign, with Warren G. Harding denouncing the “rape 
of Haiti.”47 Popular approval thus swung against Wilson, as many 
Americans decried the irony of authoritarian rule in Haiti when 
considering Wilson’s Fourteen Points and calls for self-
determination at the conclusion of World War I. 
In response to the public outrage regarding American 
imperialism in Haiti, the Senate conducted an investigation of the 
occupation from the fall of 1921 to early 1922, led by Republican 
Senator Medill McCormick.48 In November 1921, McCormick’s 
committee visited Haiti, where they met with local Haitian elites 
and listened to various testimonies detailing atrocities committed 
by Americans during the occupation. Although the committee 
dismissed many accounts as inconsistent and untrustworthy, its 
final report reflected the need for change in the occupational 
administration; rather than withdrawing, McCormick and his 
fellow senators recommended the reorganization of American 
leadership in Haiti.49 According to McCormick, “We are there, and 
in my judgment we ought to stay there for 20 years.”50 By 
restructuring the administration, the U.S. hoped to bury claims of 
American brutality under a renewed narrative of humanitarianism 
                                                          
46 McBride, Missions for Science: U.S. Technology and Medicine in America’s African 
World, 86. 
47 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 118-119. 
48 Ibid, 121. 
49 Ibid, 122. 
50 Ibid. 
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in Haiti. As the U.S. worked to cast the occupation in a more 
humane light, medicine shifted its focus from conquering the 
Haitians to civilizing them instead. 
Based on the recommendations of the McCormick 
committee, the State Department ended martial law in Haiti and 
appointed a “High Commissioner” to oversee all aspects of the 
occupation. Despite the occupational reorganization, the 
Americans remained intent on maintaining control in Haiti, and 
thus kept the Marine garrison stationed on the island. In fact, by 
appointing a military officer as High Commissioner of the 
occupation, the U.S. clearly indicated that it had no interest in 
relinquishing power to the Haitians. The new appointee, General 
John H. Russell—a Marine commander in Haiti since 1917—was 
granted total control over civilian treaty officials in addition to the 
Marines and gendarmes, and served as the direct link between the 
U.S. State Department and the puppet Haitian government.51 
Russell himself was a personification of the new policies he was 
tasked with implementing. Though he worked tirelessly “in 
supporting progressive policies in educational and economic 
uplift… he did not hold the Haitians in high regard,” considering 
them more or less to be a mix of children and savages.52 Similarly, 
U.S. policies in Haiti would henceforth focus on material and 
social improvements in Haiti, with the purpose of civilizing what 
was deemed a backwards nation. Thus, Russell’s appointment as 
High Commissioner alleviated the tension between the dueling 
civilian and military components of the administration and was 
intended to signal the occupation’s transition from pacification to 
uplift. Whereas the early years of the occupation had focused on 
stabilizing the tumultuous nation and quelling resistance among the 
“natives,” the Americans now sought to bring the benefits of 
capitalism and civilization to Haiti. 
                                                          
51 Ibid, 126. 
52 Ibid., 124-125. 
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Moving forward, medicine promised to play a key role in 
emphasizing the humanitarian aspects of the occupation and, 
therefore, American medical services in Haiti underwent a 
transition similar to that of the occupational administration. First, 
in 1923, the U.S. recruited the aid of the International Health 
Board (IHB) of the Rockefeller Foundation—a philanthropic 
organization—in improving Haitian health services. Throughout 
the early years of the occupation, members of the occupational 
administration had reached out to the IHB requesting their 
assistance in transforming conditions in Haiti.53 However, the IHB 
had repeatedly denied these requests, stating that they lacked the 
personnel necessary to add Haiti to their list of humanitarian 
projects.54 Finally, in 1923, following the urging of the U.S. State 
Department, the IHB agreed to assist with American public health 
efforts in Haiti.55 Henceforth, IHB representatives “conducted 
extensive health surveys and disease vector studies, along with a 
survey of the medical education program.”56 On the one hand, the 
collaboration with the IHB served as a sound publicity move for 
the U.S. as it worked to restore the image of the occupation as a 
humanitarian endeavor. On the other hand, there were sincere 
hopes among American medical personnel that the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s involvement would ensure that medicine fulfilled its 
humanitarian objectives in Haiti.  
In conjunction with the Rockefeller Foundation’s recent 
involvement in Haiti, in 1924—two years after the appointment of 
Russell as High Commissioner—Dr. C.S. Butler was named head 
of the Haitian Public Health Service.57 A naval medical officer 
who had served in the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, Butler 
arrived in Haiti prepared to revamp the nation’s sputtering public 
health program, and would serve as Sanitary Engineer in Haiti 
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until 1927.58 As director of health services, Butler’s goal was to 
“turn over a public health machine, as perfect in type and as 
smooth in its running as it [was] possible to make” to the Haitians 
by the time the Americans withdrew.59 In addition to Butler’s 
appointment in 1924, the Americans—after gradually increasing 
medical funds in 1922 and 1923—significantly bolstered the 
Public Health Service’s budget, allowing Butler to add personnel 
and expand health services in Haiti.60,61 Armed with a robust 
budget and ample staff, Butler set about implementing the 
objectives of medicine under the reformed U.S. occupation. 
 
The Public Health Service and U.S. Medical Practice in Haiti 
Prior to Butler’s arrival in 1924, Haiti had been divided into 
three health districts in 1918—north, south, and central—each with 
its own hospital, naval medical officer (physician), and chief 
pharmacist or chief pharmacist’s mate.62 In 1919, the 
establishment of the Public Health Service and the resulting boost 
in medical funds allowed for the construction of new hospitals and 
the further division of Haiti into nine districts. The larger 
regions—Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Aux Cayes, and Jacmel—
were overseen by a physician, whereas the smaller regions—Saint 
Mare, Gonaives, Port-de-Paix, Petit Goave, and Jeremie—fell 
under the supervision of a pharmacist.63 Upon its expansion in 
1924, the Public Health Service added a tenth district—Hinche—
and succeeded in staffing each region with a physician and 
assistant pharmacist.64 Medical duties in the districts fell into two 
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categories: hospital activities and sanitation work, supervised by 
physicians and pharmacists, respectively. Butler himself operated 
out of Port-au-Prince—home to the main office of the Public 
Health Service and the Haitian General Hospital—with a physician 
and two chief pharmacists as his assistants.65 
The General Hospital in Port-au-Prince, being “modern and 
ideal in every way,” functioned as the epicenter of all medical 
work in Haiti.66 With 350 beds, the hospital had the capacity to 
treat nearly twice as many patients as the next largest district, Cap 
Haitien, with 200.67 The General Hospital held the most advanced 
treatment and diagnostic technologies, as well as the most 
specialized medical services. For instance, while each hospital had 
its own small laboratory, the General Hospital housed the Central 
Public Health Laboratory of Haiti.68 It also was one of only three 
hospitals with an x-ray machine, and the only hospital with an eye, 
ear, nose, and throat department and specialist.69 Therefore, 
although other hospitals were able to offer general treatment to the 
patients of their districts, Port-au-Prince’s General Hospital offered 
the most advanced, comprehensive care in Haiti. However, the 
hospitals’ relatively urban locations made it difficult for the Public 
Health Service to reach the rural populace. 
In addition to geographical access, the Americans considered 
Haitian voodoo and traditional practices a major obstacle to their 
medical mission. According to Butler, most of the population 
believed in voodoo and trusted in priests and priestesses—“Papa 
Loi” and “Mama Loi”—for healing; convincing people whose 
“idea of preventive medicine [was] to tie a string with a bunch of 
[asaefoetida] attached to it around the neck” would prove 
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difficult.70 Therefore, given the reluctance of rural Haitians to stray 
from traditional healing practices, the Public Health Service 
“[developed] an extensive rural clinic service” designed to 
“awake[n] the medical and hygienic conscience of the people.”71 
In weekly and monthly intervals, the American physicians would 
set out into the countryside to treat the Haitian peasants at over 100 
rural dispensaries scattered among the health districts.72 These 
clinics often drew hundreds of patients per visit, with two 
physicians reportedly having treated 950 Haitians on one 
occasion.73 According to Butler, only town outcasts had visited the 
clinics initially, but as word spread regarding the effectiveness of 
the Americans’ medicine, attendance exploded to nearly 35,000 
patients per month.74 While Butler himself admitted that the 
medicine being practiced en masse outside the hospital was not 
“medicine of the highest order,” he maintained that the Americans’ 
strategy of mass treatment was better than leaving the people to 
their own colloquial practices.75 Encouraged by the success of the 
clinics, Butler and the Americans hoped that their practice of rural 
medicine would erode the influence of the “Papa” and “Mama Loi” 
and treat what they viewed as the Haitian “disease” of ignorance. 
To the Americans, the juxtaposition of Western medicine with 
Haitian voodoo reinforced the perception of Haitians as a 
backwards people and validated the notion that they required 
civilizing. Medicine therefore legitimized U.S. hegemony over the 
Haitians by emphasizing American superiority and portraying the 
Americans as white saviors curing Haiti of its cultural ills.  
This image manifested in a literal fashion, as the Americans 
set about treating the myriad of actual diseases plaguing Haiti. In 
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“Haiti: An Experiment in Pragmatism,” Ulysses G. Weatherly 
cited American reports that “over 50 per cent [of Haitians were] 
afflicted with worms, at least 50 per cent [were] tubercular, and 
more than a third [had] malaria.”76 In addition, the populace was 
plagued by dysentery, typhoid fever, leprosy, various water-borne 
pathogens, and a host of other diseases, resulting in a high 
morbidity rate that took a distinct toll on the Haitian population.77 
For instance, the American Marines were forced to lower the 
training standards for the Haitian gendarmerie due to the recruits’ 
poor physical stamina, and further medical examinations revealed 
that “95% of [the recruits] had blood diseases and 85% had 
intestinal worms.”78 To combat a wide array of the pathologies 
afflicting Haiti, the Americans first addressed sanitation issues in 
Haitian cities. Newly-instituted street-sweeping services kept the 
cities relatively free of garbage, gendarmes went about ticketing 
citizens for health violations, such as basins of standing water or 
“improper nightsoil removal,” and the health service capped 
springs and chlorinated water supplies.79,80 To combat malaria 
specifically, the Americans: drained low-lying swamps or filled 
them with garbage or oil; cleared underbrush; utilized mosquito 
netting at night; and distributed quinine among U.S. Marines and 
some Haitian residents.81 According to Butler, the U.S. also 
established a “quarantine station, asylum for insane and a hospital 
for lepers.”82 As if to summarize the nation’s great public health 
push, Haiti ratified the Pan American Sanitary Code in 1926.83 
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Among the spectrum of health issues facing Haiti, however, 
the primary disease target of American physicians was “yaws”—a 
close relative of syphilis that could be detected using the same 
blood test. Characterized by bone infections and painful skin 
lesions that could result in disfigurement and disability, yaws was 
the scourge of Haitian health when the U.S. invaded in 1915.84 Yet 
at the outset of the occupation, the Americans had largely 
misdiagnosed yaws, conflating the Haitians’ skin lesions as signs 
of leprosy and tertiary syphilis.85 Physicians’ inability to cure 
leprosy at the time, coupled with the stigma surrounding sexually-
transmitted diseases such as syphilis, meant that yaws went largely 
untreated prior to Butler’s arrival in Haiti in 1924.86 While 
working in the Philippines, Butler had begun lumping yaws and 
syphilis together under a single diagnosis: “treponematosis.”87 
Despite their distinct origins—yaws is a non-sexually-transmitted, 
rural disease prevalent in youth, whereas syphilis is a sexually-
transmitted disease that affects adults and urban populations—
Butler cited the two diseases’ identical progression and treatment 
(arsenic therapy) as justification for their diagnostic association.88 
Once in Haiti, Butler argued that the “innocent” yaws had been 
largely confused for its more scandalous cousin, syphilis.89 He thus 
advocated heavily for the treatment of both treponematoses in 
Haiti, which he estimated as affecting approximately 70% of 
Haitians throughout their lifetime.90 As the Public Health Service 
began to diagnose and treat treponematosis via arsenic therapy, the 
disease proved to be extremely prevalent, with the Port-au-Prince 
rural clinic reporting 3274 cases in July 1926—64% of the clinic’s 
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patient volume.91 Therefore, under Butler’s leadership, the 
Americans significantly expanded the reach of medicine and public 
health in Haiti. All in all, U.S. efforts to improve Haitian public 
health were quite extensive, and “were often highlighted by even 
the most [skeptical] observers.”92 
Nonetheless, the efficacy of U.S. medicine in Haiti was 
frequently overblown, as evidenced by the smallpox epidemic of 
1920. According to Butler, this outbreak infected about 60% of the 
Haitian populace and prompted the newly-formed Public Health 
Service to initiate a vaccination campaign.93 The Americans 
reportedly vaccinated between 850,000 and 900,000 Haitians, 
crowing that only vaccinated Haitians had avoided contracting 
smallpox.94 In this way, the Americans cast themselves as valiant 
defenders of Haitian health, a rosy characterization at best. In fact, 
U.S. officials had failed to enforce mandatory vaccination laws 
prior to the 1920 outbreak, and the manner in which smallpox tore 
through the country highlighted the shortcomings of American 
public health efforts in Haiti.95 While the vaccination campaign 
had indeed succeeded in reaching an impressive number of 
Haitians, the Americans conveniently glossed over the less 
flattering details of the epidemic. This evidenced American 
tendencies to propagandize medical work in Haiti, as well as the 
progress of the occupation as a whole.96 
 
Justification and Uplift Through Medicine 
Although the reorganization of the occupation had placed an 
increased emphasis on Haitian public health, the benevolent veneer 
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of the occupation was belied by its racist undertones, which 
subsequently caused the racialization of medicine in Haiti. 
Occupational racism largely stemmed from the attitudes of U.S. 
leadership in Haiti, as many officials had roots in the American 
culture and institutions of Jim Crow. Admiral William B. Caperton 
was a “child of the Civil War South” who believed the intervention 
was “liberal and fair” given the supposed inferiority of Haitian 
government and culture.97 Meanwhile, High Commissioner John 
Russell, originally from Georgia, supported racial segregation and 
privately considered most of the Haitian populace to be “bordering 
on a state of savagery.”98 Woodrow Wilson himself was a 
Southerner deeply shaped by the racial ideology of the Jim Crow 
era. Therefore, in subordinating the Haitians, the U.S. drew on a 
number of racist, black stereotypes. Comparing the American and 
Haitian “negroes,” Charles Chapman characterized the Haitian as 
“more subdued, simple, and well-mannered” than the American, 
yet with a “far greater burden to throw off before he can take his 
place among the civilized peoples of the earth.”99 Considering 
Haiti to be the equivalent of a “happy-go-lucky” child, the 
Americans assumed a racially paternalistic attitude towards the 
Haitians that manifested in a number of ways.100 Primarily, the 
Americans deemed the Haitians incapable of operating their own 
country, and thus the grounds that had served to justify the 
invasion of 1915 also established the racial hierarchy of the 
occupation. During the occupation, white Americans held all 
positions of ultimate authority, originating in the office of the High 
Commissioner and disseminating into the lower ranks of the 
administration.101 In the gendarmerie, not a single Haitian 
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advanced past the white Marine officers in rank, and only five 
Haitians had been promoted to the rank of captain by 1929.102 The 
Americans also conferred special treatment to the lighter-skinned, 
elite mulatto class of Haiti, installing them as puppet rulers.103 
Medicine itself also served to further entrench occupational 
racism. In the Public Health Service, all the hospitals were run by 
white naval medical officers, while Haitian doctors, nurses, and 
technicians—comprising a majority of the staff—assumed 
subordinate positions and carried out menial tasks. Racism also 
played a factor in the American reluctance to treat syphilitic 
patients in Haiti. Prior to C.S. Butler’s categorization of yaws and 
syphilis under the same diagnosis, treponematosis, all patients 
infected with Treponema were diagnosed as syphilitic.104 This 
played into “derisive, longstanding stereotypes of uncontrolled 
black promiscuity,” and rationalized American refusals to treat the 
Haitians for syphilis due to the supposedly “insurmountable 
biological and cultural defects among Haitian society.”105 Thus, 
racist ideologies caused American physicians to view their Haitian 
patients as subhuman, and fed into the perceived “moral obligation 
of the white races… to assist [the] little Caribbean republic to her 
feet.”106 Haiti symbolized not only the white man’s burden, but 
more specifically, the physician’s burden as well. 
The racial paternalism of the occupation meant that, even 
following occupational reform, the humanitarian vision of 
medicine in Haiti remained tarnished. Namely, medicine’s primary 
goals in the latter half of the occupation were: 1) to revive the 
Haitian economy by improving the health of individual Haitians; 
2) to civilize the Haitians; 3) most importantly, to justify the 
continued American presence in Haiti. With regards to U.S. 
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capitalist aims, C.S. Butler himself advertised medicine as the 
remedy to Haiti’s economic woes, stating:  
 
By elevating the standard of health, [the government] 
increases the earning capacity of the laborers… 
[E]xperience… in the Caribbean… and western Tropics 
shows that it is best for generals of commerce and industry, 
as well as for military generals to ‘purchase this big thing 
from the physician.’107 
 
Butler’s statement made evident the aims of the restructured 
U.S. occupation. Following the reorganization of the 
administration in Haiti in the early 1920s, it soon became clear that 
the occupation’s focus had simply shifted from military conquest 
to economic uplift. In 1927, for example, the United States 
continued to exert total control over Haitian finances, funneling 
$2.68 million—$1 million more than necessary—towards paying 
off Haitian debt to U.S.-based creditors.108 In comparison, public 
health received only $0.68 million of the Haitian budget, indicating 
that health remained less of a priority than U.S. economic interests 
in Haiti.109 Therefore, the economic motives of the U.S. occupation 
meant that increased medical outreach was mainly for the purpose 
of keeping Haitian workers healthy and improving Haitian 
agricultural productivity.110 As the U.S. sought to revitalize the 
Haitian economy, medicine transitioned from treating Haitians as 
combatants to treating them as the means of production. 
In addition to improving the Haitian economy, the U.S. saw 
medicine as a means of raising the Haitians from their seemingly 
uncultured, ignorant existence. According to Hans Schmidt, 
“Americans, as representatives of an advanced, modern, 
industrialized nation, felt that they could transform backward, 
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underdeveloped Haiti with American technology and practical 
ingenuity.”111 These sentiments were espoused by Ulysses B. 
Weatherly, who in his article, “Haiti: An Experiment in 
Pragmatism,” insisted that “intelligent guidance from without may 
sometimes accelerate the process of national growth and save 
much waste.”112 American disdain for Haitian capabilities applied 
to medicine as well, with C.S. Butler remarking: “With politics in 
such a shocking condition… what could we expect from [Haiti] for 
medical education or sanitation or for hospitals…?”113 In the eyes 
of Butler, “from 1804 to 1915, the medical side of Haiti’s story 
[was] not long to tell,” and America had “a moral obligation… of 
rendering to backward peoples… much-needed medical 
assistance.”114 
In order to bestow the “gift” of Western medicine upon the 
Haitians, Butler and the Americans considered a modern medical 
education system of chief importance in Haiti.115 Towards this aim, 
in 1926, the Haitian government allocated $50,000 for the 
construction of a new medical school in Port-au-Prince. The 
medical school would initially be run by the naval medical 
officers, who would train classes of 15-20 Haitian medical students 
over a period of four years, after which they would complete a 
one-year internship.116 To ensure a high quality education for the 
Haitian students, the Americans secured an extra $30,000—three 
yearly installments of $10,000 —from the Rockefeller Foundation 
to furnish the school with new medical equipment.117 Finally, the 
Rockefeller Foundation also provided Haitian doctors with 
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fellowship opportunities in the United States and Europe in order 
to enhance their training.118 
Although of undeniable benefit to the Haitians, the emphasis 
on improved medical education did not spring from a place of 
beneficence on the part of the Americans, but rather of necessity. 
Indeed, up until the late 1920s, the Haitians had operated solely as 
subordinates to the American physicians—this was due in large 
part to the Americans’ racist preconceptions regarding the 
competence of Haitian medical personnel.119 For instance, when 
K.C. Melhorn called the Dean of the Haitian Medical School into 
his office to brief him on the intricacies of the Public Health 
Service’s budget, “the Dean’s eyes ‘fairly bugged out’ for… ‘he 
had not realized all the other elements entering into the Sanitary 
budget.’”120 Therefore, had the deadline for the American 
withdrawal from Haiti not been fast-approaching, the Americans 
would likely never have considered fully training Haitian 
physicians. However, facing the imminent U.S. withdrawal, the 
Americans had no choice but to pass the reigns of their public 
health machine to the Haitians and hope that “the foundations for a 
Haitian medical personnel… [would] be able to carry on according 
to the plans laid down by their American friends.”121 
The primary function of medicine in the later years of the 
occupation, however, was to legitimize American control over 
Haiti. Following reports of U.S. Marine brutality in the early years 
of the occupation, the Americans were desperate for favorable 
propaganda surrounding their presence in Haiti; medicine provided 
them with the perfect justification.122 Richard Parsons raved that 
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“the yaws work [stood] out as the most glowing chapter of all 
Haitian medicine… because of its tremendous accomplishments 
for the human and economic betterment of Haiti.”123 Dr. Elwood 
Mead, after visiting Haiti in 1926, marveled at how the Public 
Health Service had succeeded in bringing “the benefits of modern 
medical science and sanitation” to the Haitians, stating, “Today 
Port-au-Prince is as clean and sanitary as Washington.”124 Thus, 
medicine portrayed the Americans not only as benevolent, but 
infallible, and blame for any shortcomings of the occupation 
landed squarely on Haitian shoulders. For instance, when 
American attempts to eradicate yaws in 1929 failed, it was due to 
the “ignorance of the people.”125 Similarly, concerns regarding the 
ability of Haitian nurses in Port-au-Prince stemmed from their lack 
of initiative and responsibility, not poor instruction.126 Thus, 
medicine fed into U.S. propaganda regarding the occupation, and 
served to vindicate the takeover of Haiti by erasing American 
ineptitudes. 
 
U.S. Withdrawal and Fallout 
As the U.S. occupation wore on, it became increasingly 
difficult to ignore the growing discontent in Haiti. Contrary to U.S. 
public portrayals of the occupation, many Haitians had always 
resented the Americans running their country, and the puppet 
administrations installed by the Americans relied heavily on U.S. 
military might to keep them in power. For example, in 1915, the 
newly-established president, Sudre Dartiguenave, lasted a mere 
month before the U.S. felt it necessary to impose martial law in 
Haiti.127 Backed by the U.S., Dartiguenave remained as president 
until 1922, when he refused to authorize the consolidation of 
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Haitian debt in the U.S.-owned Banque Nationale—a move that 
practically sold Haiti’s “soul” to U.S. creditors.128 Over the years, 
Dartiguenave had grown resistant to U.S. objectives in Haiti, and 
therefore the Americans made sure Dartiguenave’s replacement, 
Louis Borno, would be more amenable to U.S. demands. Borno—
who admired the Italian fascist leader, Benito Mussolini—was a 
proponent of U.S. authoritarian uplift in Haiti and a willing 
participant in the Americans’ anti-democratic machinations.129 
However, Borno’s continued refusal to assemble the Haitian 
Council of State and thus allow for presidential elections prompted 
student strikes in 1929, which soon developed into full-fledged 
riots by the political opposition.130 Faced with growing tensions in 
Haiti, the Americans ousted Borno and conveniently sidestepped 
the electoral provisions of the Haitian Constitution to pronounce 
Eugene Roy—a candidate agreed upon by both Haitian parties—as 
the interim president.131 While the immediate collapse of the 
occupation was avoided, the political unrest of 1929 marked the 
beginning of the end of the U.S. occupation. 
By 1930, Haiti had ceased to be worth the headache it was 
causing the Americans, and the U.S. began a slow exit from the 
island nation. With Europe no longer a threat to its hegemony in 
the Western hemisphere and the Great Depression’s devastating 
effect on the domestic economy, the U.S. had little interest in 
running a small Caribbean nation chafing against American 
authority. Unwilling to remain in Haiti until 1936—per the 
stipulations of the 1915 Haitian-American Treaty—yet recognizing 
that a hasty retreat would destabilize Haiti and reflect poorly upon 
the U.S., the Americans opted for a prolonged withdrawal.132 
When the last remaining Marine detachment left Haiti in August 
1934, the Americans spun their departure as “a positive affirmation 
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of the new Good Neighbor Policy in Latin America,” not an 
unceremonious retreat.133 While the Americans pronounced their 
intervention a success, upon closer examination, the supposed 
benefits of the American occupation in Haiti could scarcely be 
found. While in Haiti, the Americans had controlled nearly all 
aspects of the occupation, leaving the Haitian government and 
civilian professionals starved of experience and education.134 
Following the American withdrawal, the Haitian government 
found itself further indebted to foreign creditors, Haitian 
technology lagged behind that of other Latin American nations, 
and a vast majority of the Haitian populace remained 
impoverished, unhealthy, and uneducated.135 Thus, after nearly two 
decades of atrophy under U.S. rule, Haitian government and 
society struggled to operate effectively. 
The abysmal fallout of the American intervention in Haiti 
subsequently brought the legacy of occupation medicine into 
question. Had the Haitians actually benefited from American aid? 
In the aftermath of the occupation, the Americans proudly 
proclaimed that U.S. medicine had treated droves of Haitians for 
disease and made massive improvements to the Haitian public 
health system. However, during the slow U.S. transition out of 
Haiti, “the health systems infrastructure was slowly dismantled— 
the budget was slashed, prescriptions were watered down, and 
Haitians were expected to pay for or provide their own bandages 
and oils, by order of the Sanitation Engineer.”136 America’s callous 
exit exposed occupation medicine as no more than a travelling 
clinic, gone as fast as it had come. In the meantime, Haiti was still 
mired in disease and left unprepared to treat itself. “Haitian 
medical personnel had been starved of experience for nearly two 
decades,” and were unable to adequately address Haiti’s daunting 
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public health challenges following the U.S. withdrawal.137 
American medicine thus caused Haiti to become increasingly 
reliant on foreign medical aid in the aftermath of the U.S. 
occupation. Although medicine addressed many of the immediate 
health issues facing Haiti, it failed to provide for the long-term 
health of its Haitian “patient.” 
 
Conclusion 
The U.S. occupation of Haiti demonstrated the susceptibility 
of medicine to political and social aims. As the U.S. sought to 
control Haiti in the early years of the occupation, American 
military and political objectives led to the selective practice of 
medicine on behalf of the Haitians. Medicine looked to stabilize 
Haiti by fostering an environment in which the American military 
could operate, and as a result, the Haitians were often viewed as 
combatants rather than patients. Once the brutal martial law 
imposed by the Americans was no longer acceptable in the public 
eye, medicine worked to cast the occupation in a more humane 
light. However, the lenses of racism and economic uplift distorted 
medicine’s view of the Haitians, reducing patients to little more 
than ignorant children and the economic means of production. 
Nevertheless, the treatment of disease and development of public 
health infrastructure in Haiti served as wonderful propaganda for 
the Americans, who highlighted medicine as a primary justification 
for the continued U.S. presence in Haiti. Ultimately, once the 
Americans lost interest in the Haitian project, the beneficent hand 
of American medicine was quickly retracted, and the Haitians were 
left perhaps worse off than before. Thus, the politics of the U.S. 
occupation drastically affected the goals of medicine and how it 
was practiced in Haiti. From the occupation, we can see that 
medicine in and of itself is not inherently good. Rather, it depends 
upon the context in which it is practiced and the aims that it serves.  
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C.S. Butler was correct in saying, “We physicians have failed 
to appreciate the enormous importance of our calling in helping 
[government].”138 However, he failed to recognize the reciprocal 
impact that government had on him and his fellow physicians. 
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